Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 2 Issue 2 - March 1961

Article 6

3-1961

Financing Industrial Development in the South
Margie F. Pitts

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Contracts Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Taxation-State and
Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Margie F. Pitts, Financing Industrial Development in the South, 14 Vanderbilt Law Review 621 (1961)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol14/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information,
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

NOTE
FINANCING INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH*
I. INTRODUCTION

The increasing pressures for economic growth and higher per
capita income have caused our governmental units to expand their
activities to attract new industry. One of the major problems of
the past half century has been underemployment of resources resulting, among other causes, from the persistence of agrarian ways
and low rates of investment. This problem has been especially acute
in the southern region of the United States; in an effort to meet this
problem, state and local governmental units have undertaken to
supplement federal activities in encouraging industrial development
by attracting new firms to their region.
Availability of labor supply, transportation facilities, and natural
resources proved insufficient inducement for industrialization at the
desired rate; under stiff competition among the states, ways to make
the region more attractive were devised. One of the "opportunities"
offered prospective industries has been the industrial building program authorized by legislation or constitutional amendment in six
southern states. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the various
methods of industrial building financing available in Alabama,
Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. The
three most popular methods of financing have been adopted in Tennessee; therefore, Tennessee legislation is primarily considered here,
the statutes of the other states being discussed largely by way of
comparison.
Industrial building financing in Tennessee may be by the issuance
of revenue bonds under the 1951 act,' payable solely from the rental
proceeds received from the building lease; by issuance of general
obligation bonds under the 1955 act,2 secured by a pledge of the
municipality's credit and taxing power; or by the issuance of industrial development corporation bonds, 3 the security for these
being limited to a lien on rentals received from the lease of the
building.
* Much of this Note was originally prepared as a research paper for the
seminar in Legal Prob!ems of Regional Economic Development at Vanderbilt University School of Law.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1701 (1956).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2901 (Supp. 1960).
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2801 (Supp. 1960).
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It is the declared purpose of these acts to curb migration, relieve
unemployment and reduce attendant evils, raise per capita income,
and balance the economy by creating job opportunities. 4 The expenditure of funds derived from the issuance of general obligation
bonds under the 1955 act presents the troublesome question of
whether or not the expenditure for industrial buildings meets the
"public purpose" limitation which has been written into our state
constitution and universally recognized as a limitation on local
government spending.
II. INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS

The 1951 legislation and amendments authorize municipalities and
counties to issue revenue bonds to finance the construction, purchase,
or improvement of buildings within the municipality or county to be
leased to industrial concerns. The act requires that the lease be on
terms which will provide for the retirement of the principal and
payment of the interest on bonds. 5 Revenue bonds issued under this
act are not indebtednesses of the municipality nor a loan of its credit.
The act specifically provides that no bondholder may compel the
municipality to exercise its taxing power to pay the bonds; instead,
the bonds constitute a lien on the rentals received under the lease
agreement and may be secured by a lien on the buildings and land.6
The federal government has added an incentive to investment in
this type of security by providing that interest income from munici7
pal bonds is not subject to the federal income tax.
A municipality must submit the question of issuance of the bonds
to the will of its qualified voters and must receive approval of a
three-fourths majority of those voting on the issue.8 The question of
issuance may be determined by the voters without designating the
industry to utilize the proceeds, the interest rate (below a maximum),
or the method or time of repayment of the principal. This permits a
municipality to have issues authorized, "lying-in-wait" for a prospective industrial concern, thus expediting the mechanical processes required to make funds available for constructing the building.
The 1951 act has been upheld as constitutional by the Supreme
Court of Tennessee. In Holly v. City of Elizabethton,9 the court
stated:
There is nothing in the Constitution which forbids our Legislature from
4. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1703 (1956); Tenn. Pub. Acts 1955, ch. 209.
5. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1715 (1956).
6. TENN. CODE ANI. § 6-1708, -09 (1956).

7. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 103 (a) (1).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-1710 (1956).
9. Holly v. City of Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951).
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authorizing a municipality to promote a private industry in the manner

authorized by the aforementioned provision of Chapter 137, since those
provisions do not authorize the use of moneys raised by taxation for
10
the accomplishment of the incidental public purpose intended ....
Even though the 1951 act was declared constitutional and there
was great utility in this method of financing, it was felt that, due
to their limited nature, these bonds did not fully utilize the available
source of investment capital. The bonds were not secured by a pledge
of municipal credit and taxing power and therefore were not "negotiable" under the state's Negotiable Instruments Law. That these
bonds are not negotiable seems well settled. Under the Law Merchant
and at common law," an instrument payable solely out of a particular
fund was not negotiable because it did not carry the general personal
credit of the obligor and payment was contingent upon the sufficiency
of the fund referred to. This rule has been codified by the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law. 12 The effect of this non-negotiable
characteristic is that an instrument is subject to all defenses of the
maker which may be asserted against the bond in the hands of the
holder or his transferee. This does not impair the validity or transferability of the bond if no defense exists. The investment securities
section of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, removes bonds
from the NIL and makes negotiability depend upon whether the
security is of the type dealt in upon the securities markets or recognized in the area in which it is issued as a medium for investment.
This means that such bonds are negotiable (for the purpose of cutting
off defenses) even though they do not meet the formal requirements
3
of the NIL.'
It is intended that these revenue bonds entail only limited liability
to the issuing municipality; however, it seems that a holder of
revenue bonds may have recourse against the municipality for payment of the bonds out of general funds if there was misrepresentation, negligence, breach of an implied covenant or warranty, or
breach of trust in issuance. Thus there is need for close scrutiny of
the issuance procedure by bond counsel for the purpose of determin10. 193 Tenn. at 54, 241 S.W.2d at 1005. See recent case of West v. Industrial Dev. Bd., 332 S.W.2d 201 (Tenn. 1960), which reiterates this
position.

11. People's Bank v. Moore, 201 Ala. 411, 78 So. 789 (1918); Rector v.
Strauss, 134 Ark. 374, 203 S.W. 1024 (1918); Hanna v. McCrory, 19 N.M. 183,
141 Pac. 996 (1914). BerIToN, BiLLs & NoTEs § 11 (1943).
12. UNIFoRm NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 3, which has been adopted
by Alabama, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, provides that
one of the requirements of negotiability is "an unconditional promise to
pay." See Public Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Garcia Sugars Corps., 173 Misc.
364, 16 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1939).
13. UNIFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 8-101 to -105, -301 which has been
adopted by Kentucky.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

ing that no defense to the validity of the bonds exists. If for some
reason the general funds of a municipality are utilized in discharging
these bonds, the public purpose doctrine, hereinafter discussed in
4
relation to general obligation bonds, may be applicable.'
III.

GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS

In order to provide a more attractive investment and to make it
feasible for small towns to issue bonds, an act was passed in 1955
authorizing the issuance of general obligation bonds. These bonds
carry a pledge of the municipality's full faith and credit and taxing
power for their payment, thus constituting an "unconditional promise
to pay" as required by the NIL. The proceeds of these bonds may
be used for the purchase, construction, or addition to industrial
buildings for lease to industrial concerns. The interest income
produced by this type bond is also exempt from federal income taxation.
If a municipality desires to issue bonds under this act, it must
apply to the Building Finance Committee of the Tennessee Industrial and Agricultural Commission for a "Certificate of Public
Purpose and Necessity."' 1 After this is granted, the bond issue must
be authorized, on the specific terms approved by the committee,
by a referendum in which the same is approved by a three-fourths
majority of those voting.
The 1955 act, insofar as it authorizes municipalities to pledge
their full faith and credit and taxing power, presents a very basic
legal question: Is the expenditure for industrial buildings an expenditure of public funds for a public purpose? As heretofore pointed
out, the 1951 act was held constitutional because it did "not authorize
the use of moneys raised by taxation" for the accomplishment of
what the court termed an "incidental public purpose."
A county, town, city, or other political subdivision has no power
to impose taxes except where it is granted such power by the state
constitution or has been authorized by legislative action.' 6 One of
14. Lyman v. Chase, 178 Minn. 244, 226 N.W. 633 (1929); Kinney v. City
of Astoria, 108 Ore. 514, 217 Pac. 840 (1923). Note, Incentives to Industrial
Relocation: The Municipal IndustrialBond Plans, 66 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1953).
15. The committee is charged with the duty of investigating and determining the following: (1) that there are sufficient natural resources
available for the use and operation of the particular industrial building and
enterprise for at least ten years; (2) that there is available a labor supply
to furnish at least one and one-half workers for each operative job within
an area of twenty-five miles; and (3) that there are adequate property
values and suitable financial conditions so that the total bonded indebtedness
of the municipality, for industrial building purposes, shall not exceed ten
per cent of the total assessed valuation of all the property in the municipality.
TwN. CODE ANN.§ 6-2906 (Supp. 1960).
16. Union Ice & Coal Co. v. Ruston, 135 La. 898, 66 So. 262 (1914); City
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the areas traditionally forbidden is the levy of a tax to assist a
private enterprise.' 7 This limitation grew out of public spending
in aid of railroads in the early 1830's. The corruption, over-extension
of public credit, and attempted repudiation of the public debts are
now a part of our history. States, in attempting to prevent a repeat
8
performance, have included prohibitions in their constitutions or
have passed statutes prohibiting a loan of credit for private enterprise.
The Supreme Court of the United States gave recognition to the
public purpose limitation upon municipal taxation in Loan Association v. Topeka. 19 The Court did not base its decision on the due
process argument but rather treated it as an inherent limitation of
government.
Tennessee has given recognition to the public purpose limitation
in its constitution and its case law. Article 2, section 29 sets forth
the limitation under which taxing power can be conferred by the
General Assembly upon counties and towns. It provides:
The General Assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties
and incorporated towns in this State, to impose taxes for County and
Corporation purposes respectively, in such manner as shall be prescribed
by law ... But the credit of no County, City or Town shall be given
or loaned to or in aid of any person, company, association or corporation, except upon an election to be first held by the qualified voters of
such county, city or town, and the assent of three-fourths of the votes
cast at said election....
This provision was interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Ferrell v. Doak,2 0 which tested the constitutionality of a private act
empowering the town of Lebanon to issue bonds to be used in the
construction of a building to be leased to a box manufacturer. The
bonds were to be secured by the taxing power and credit of the
town of Lebanon. In applying the public purpose doctrine, the court
stated:
However commendable the proposed movement, it must be and is
frankly conceded that public funds to be provided by taxation may be
of Boston v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 338 Mass. 245, 154 N.E.2d 702 (1958);
Eisenstadt v. Suffolk County, 331 Mass. 570, 120 N.E.2d 924 (1954); Prince v.
Crocker, 166 Mass. 347, 44 N.E. 446 (1896); and Opinion of the Justices, 155
Mass. 598, 30 N.E. 1142 (1892). See also Antieau, Municipal Power to TaxIts Constitutional Limitations, 8 VAN. L. Riy. 698, 733 (1955).
17. Laughlin v. Portland, 111 Me. 486, 90 Atl. 318 (1914), and cases cited
in note 16 supra.
18. TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 29; N.C. CoNST. art. v, § 3.
19. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 655 (1874). See also Cole
v. LaGrange, 113 U.S. 1 (1885); Dodge v. Mission Tp., 107 Fed. 827 (8th
Cir. 1901); Manning v. Devils Lake, 13 N.D. 47, 99 N.W. 51 (1904); Bolton v.
Wharton, 163 S.C. 244, 161 S.E. 454 (1931).

20. Ferrell v. Doak, 152 Tenn. 88, 275 S.W. 29 (1925).
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expended only for a public purpose, and, unless the purpose in view may
be reasonably so classified, the act conflicts with article 2, section 29, of
our Constitution. By this section the General Assembly is empowered
to authorize incorporated towns to impose taxes for corporation purposes
only. Is the proposed purpose a corporation; that is, public purpose?21
In answering this question the court recognized it to be
well settled that taxation cannot be imposed for the purpose of establishing, aiding, or maintaining private business enterprises whose sole
object is private emolument of the proprietors, no matter how beneficial
to the community such enterprises may be.22
Thus in 1925 the proposed expenditure of funds for the purpose of
bringing an industry to Lebanon by constructing a building was not
an expenditure for a public purpose.
In 1955 the legislature of Tennessee empowered towns, cities, and
counties to tax for the payment of bonds issued to build industrial
buildings. The constitutional validity of this act was questioned in
McConnell v. City of Lebanon.23 The trial court held that the bonds
issued under this act were for a public purpose and "even though
for the sole private purpose to aid private industry, yet since the
bonds were issued pursuant to the terms of the statute and ratified
by a three-fourths vote in the referendum election.., they would be
valid."2 4 The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the chancellor in
the first of these holdings but found that in order for the bond issue
to be a valid pledge of the taxing power, the purpose must be a public purpose. The court, in construing Article 2, section 29, held
that the first sentence, declaring that any grant of taxing power
must be for municipal or county purposes, prevailed over the
latter portion of the section which seemed to authorize use of taxing
power for any purpose provided the purpose be sanctioned by threefourths vote. The question before the court in the later case was
the same as that in Ferrell v. Doak: Is the proposed purpose a public
purpose? In McConnell the court recognized that "our own cases
declare that what is a county or corporate purpose is incapable of
an exact and all-inclusive definition and that each case must turn
upon its own facts."2 5 The court reviewed various Census Bureau
statistics and newspaper stories regarding county and state migration
and stated:
[W]e have presented to us a situation that is quite different from that
21. 152 Tenn. at 90,
22. 152 Tenn. at 96,

275 S.W.
275 S.W.

at 29.
at 31.

23. McConnell v. City of Lebanon, 203 Tenn. 498, 314 S.W.2d 12 (1955).
24. 203 Tenn. at 504, 314 S.W.2d at 15.
25. 203 Tenn. at 510, 314 S.W.2d at 17.
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existing 30 years ago [apparently referring to the Ferrell v. Doak age].
It is the difference between a mere incident and a virtual crisis. Thus
becomes applicable the principle of constitutional law that a legislative
enactment may be held unconstitutional under one set of facts and
constitutional under another set of facts ....
Hence, we do not overrule
Ferrellv. Doak .... 26

The court then specifically holds that the "statute and the proceedings of the town of Lebanon thereunder are not in violation of
Art. II, Section 29 of the Constitution of this State."
Since the court refused to overrule Ferrell v. Doak, the holding
in McConnell v. City of Lebanon as to the constitutionality of the
act based on the existence of a crisis appears to be limited to the
town of Lebanon for that particular period of time. The court held
that there was an employment and migration crisis in Lebanon
and Wilson County which converted the pledge of taxing power from
the private purpose of aiding Hartmann Luggage Co. to a public
purpose of alleviating .the unemployment and migration situation.
Quaere, under the McConnell holding is it not necessary for there
to be what is tantamount to a "crisis" in a city or other governmental
subdivision before a pledge of taxing power can be said to be for a
public purpose? Are we to apply literally the rule stated by the
court that "what is a county or corporate purpose is incapable of
an exact and all-inclusive definition and that each case must turn
upon its own facts"? If this be true, would the holder of a bond
issued under the 1955 act be able to determine the extent of the
municipality's liability thereon without having a judicial determination "upon its own facts"?
Many areas of our state are industrializing at a rapid rate. Where
there is an influx of people to an area, with no appreciable unemployment problem, and no real deficit in per capita income in that
area as related to the national average, it seems that it would be
very difficult to establish a "crisis" sufficient to convert aiding
private business into a public purpose.

IV. COmPARABLE LEGISLATION WITHIN THE REGION
Other states in the region, Alabama, 27 Arkansas, 28 Kentucky,
Louisiana, 0 and Mississippi, 31 have provided for financing industrial
building.
26. 203 Tenn. at 514, 314 S.W.2d at 19.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

ALA. CODE. ANN. tit. 37 § 511 (20) (1951).
Amc. CONST., Amend. No. 49.
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 103.200 (1955).
LA. CONST., art. 14, § 14 (b.2) (1952).
Miss. CODE ANN. § 8936-01 (1953).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 14

Alabama has legislation similar to the 1951 Tennessee act, authorizing revenue bonds payable solely from rentals, and an Industrial
Development Corporation act hereinafter discussed. In Newberry v.
City of Andalusia,32 the revenue bond act was held constitutional;
the bonds did not come under the constitutional definition of "municipal indebtedness."
Arkansas has provided for the issuance of similar bonds by constitutional amendment. This power is limited to cities of first or
second class 33 and counties. The question must be submitted to
referendum and must pass by vote of a majority of the qualified
electors voting on the question. The amendment also provides that
the issuing governmental unit may levy a special tax for the discharge of the indebtedness.
The Kentucky act authorizes the issuance of industrial revenue
bonds without the pledge of municipal credit. Approval of an
issue in Kentucky is by ordinance of the legislative body of the
municipality. The constitutionality of this act was upheld in FauZ34
coner v. City of Danville.
The Louisiana constitutional amendment provides for issuance of
general obligation bonds up to twenty per cent of the assessed
valuation of the taxable property of the issuing municipality. The
validity of this amendment was upheld in Miller v. Police Jury, 226
La. 8, 74 So. 2d 394 (1954), as being in the "public interest."
The only legislation in Mississippi authorizes issuance of general
obligation bonds. The full faith and credit of the municipality is
pledged with a twenty per cent limitation of the total assessed valuation of the property of the municipality. This act was upheld by
Albritton v. City of Winona35 which declared relieving unemployment to be a public purpose.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF FINANCING
36

In Alabama, Arkansas, 37 and Tennessee 38 an additional method of
industrial financing has been provided by legislation authorizing the
organization of Industrial Development Corporations. Under these
acts a municipality or county may establish an industrial board
which obtains a charter of incorporation from the Secretary of State
in the same manner as any other corporation. This corporation may
32.
33.
34.
35.

Newberry v. City of Andalusia, 257 Ala. 49, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952).
Cities with population over 105,000.
Faulconer v. City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950).
Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799 (1938).
36. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 37 § 815 (1959).
37. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-516 (1956),
38. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-2801 (Supp. 1960).
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issue bonds payable solely from revenues realized from the lease
or sale of industrial buildings. This act also provides that the corporation may issue another type bond which, given authority by
the municipality, may pledge the full faith and credit of the municipality to payment of the bonds. Authority to pledge the full faith
and credit of a municipality under this act is contingent upon obtaining a "Certificate of Public Purpose and Necessity" from a state
agency in the same manner as under the 1955 Tennessee Industrial
Building Bond Act.
No cases have been decided under the Tennessee act; however,
in Arkansas, Halbert v. Helena-W. Helena Industrial Dev. Corp.39
established the constitutionality of a similar act after striking therefrom the provision for the corporation to pledge the municipal
credit. The court indicated that this would be permitting cities,
towns, and counties to do indirectly what they could not do directly,
namely, to grant financial aid to private businesses or corporations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In attempting to evaluate the industrial building finance program,
it must be recognized that the advantages are not without some
correlative defects. Generally, the advantages of such a program from
the industry's viewpoint are:
(1) The legislative enactments provide a source of financing, in
addition to ordinary sources of capital, for the firm interested in
expanding or relocating without tying up its capital in fixed investments of building and equipment.
(2) An ad valorem tax advantage is gained by the industry since
under the rental agreement the building (and equipment in some
states) is the property of the municipality and exempt from local
taxation.
(3) A further tax advantage may accrue to the industry since in
many cases the industry itself purchases a portion of the revenue
or general obligation bonds and the interest income produced is
not subject to federal income taxation.
As far as the states are concerned, an advantage is gained by having
such laws over competing states in the region not having industrial
building legislation when the firm considering moving its location
is also seeking some financial assistance. This may well be the decisive factor persuading a firm to choose a particular locale.
39. Halbert v. Helena-W. Helena Industrial Dev. Corp., 226 Ark. 620, 291

S.W.2d 802 (1956).
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The opponents of the legislation generally point out the following
disadvantages:
(1) Public funds at lower interest rates are placed in competition
with private funds and may tend to displace such funds rather
than to complement them.
(2) The use of the same type financing (general obligation bonds
specifically) which is used for financing conventional public projects, such as schools, roads, water systems, etc., for the purpose
of financing plants for private industry is considered by many a
departure from the traditional sphere of municipal activity which
may lead Congress to re-examine the tax exempt status of municipal bonds. 40 Also, this could seriously hamper the ability of a
community to finance more conventional municipal projects if
industrial building financing were to absorb the percentage of tax
base allowed by the constitution or statutes for total municipal
indebtedness. 41 This problem is magnified when one realizes that
a new plant and additional population which it attracts will increase
the need for roads, schools, and other public facilities.
(3) The existence of municipally owned buildings, exempt from
local property taxes, grants the company which occupies them an
unfair tax advantage over the industry financing its own building;
furthermore, it dilutes the community tax base. In the event of
failure of a firm occupying municipal buildings, it would be
necessary for the municipality to meet bond obligations resulting
in an increase in the tax rate or payment from public funds, thus
imposing an additional burden on a self-financing industry which
might prove to be a deterrent to future industry location.
Proponents of public industrial building financing justify their
position by pointing to the need to supplement private investment
and to raise the level of per capita income in areas which have
chronically suffered from this condition. The view one adopts of
such financing is often couched on the high theme of free enterprise
versus governmental participation. Yet the problem may also be
viewed from the perspective of the South and its immediate needs.
In the long run, it might well be that this program will have served
to furnish a starting point for the process of development which would
lead to enhanced opportunities for private funds and may have within
its structure some elements of its own departure.
MARGIE F. PiTTs
40. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN 175-200 (1960); Ratchford,
Revenue Bonds and Tax Immunity, 7 NATL TAX J. 40 (1954); Note, Legal

Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59 CoLUM. L.
REv. 618, 637 (1959).
41. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-912 (1956),

which limits a municipality's total

bonded indebtedness to fifteen per cent of the assessed property valuation.

